Intensionality and the gödel theorems

Philosophical Studies 48 (3):337--51 (1985)
Abstract
Philosophers of language have drawn on metamathematical results in varied ways. Extensionalist philosophers have been particularly impressed with two, not unrelated, facts: the existence, due to Frege/Tarski, of a certain sort of semantics, and the seeming absence of intensional contexts from mathematical discourse. The philosophical import of these facts is at best murky. Extensionalists will emphasize the success and clarity of the model theoretic semantics; others will emphasize the relative poverty of the mathematical idiom; still others will question the aptness of the standard extensional semantics for mathematics. In this paper I investigate some implications of the Gödel Second Incompleteness Theorem for these positions. I argue that the realm of mathematics, proof theory in particular, has been a breeding ground for intensionality and that satisfactory intensional semantic theories are implicit in certain rigorous technical accounts.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF01305394
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Undecidable Theories.Alfred Tarski - 1968 - Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co..
Mathematical Logic.J. Donald Monk - 1976 - Springer Verlag.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Self-Reference in Arithmetic I.Volker Halbach & Albert Visser - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (4):671-691.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

290 ( #10,969 of 2,177,988 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #45,332 of 2,177,988 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums