Putting the horse before the cart: A pragmatist analysis of knowledge

Trans/Form/Ação 34 (2):135-152 (2011)
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Abstract

The definition of knowledge as justified true belief is the best we presently have. However, the canonical tripartite analysis of knowledge does not do justice to it due to a Platonic conception of a priori truth that puts the cart before the horse. Within a pragmatic approach, I argue that by doing away with a priori truth, namely by submitting truth to justification, and by accordingly altering the canonical analysis of knowledge, this is a fruitful definition. So fruitful indeed that it renders the Gettier counterexamples vacuous, allowing positive work in epistemology and related disciplines.

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Luis M. Augusto
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Citations of this work

Toward a general theory of knowledge.Luis M. Augusto - 2020 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 1 (1):63-97.
An Application of Peircean Triadic Logic: Modelling Vagueness.Asim Raza, Asim D. Bakhshi & Basit Koshul - 2019 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 28 (3):389-426.
Do unconscious beliefs yield knowledge?Luis M. Augusto - 2009 - Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 18 (35):161-184.

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References found in this work

Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
Some consequences of four incapacities.Charles S. Peirce - 1868 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2 (3):140 - 157.

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