Putting the horse before the cart: A pragmatist analysis of knowledge

Trans/Form/Ação 34 (2):135-152 (2011)
Abstract
The definition of knowledge as justified true belief is the best we presently have. However, the canonical tripartite analysis of knowledge does not do justice to it due to a Platonic conception of a priori truth that puts the cart before the horse. Within a pragmatic approach, I argue that by doing away with a priori truth, namely by submitting truth to justification, and by accordingly altering the canonical analysis of knowledge, this is a fruitful definition. So fruitful indeed that it renders the Gettier counterexamples vacuous, allowing positive work in epistemology and related disciplines.
Keywords Justified true belief. Epistemic justification. A priori truth
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DOI 10.1590/S0101-31732011000200008
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References found in this work BETA
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
The Semantic Conception of Truth: And the Foundations of Semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:1-50.

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