A general theory of acts, with application to the distinction between rational and irrational 'social cognition'

A general theory of acts leads to a theory of cognition distinguishing between formation of apriorical knowledge about values, norms, and cognitive beliefs, based on conditioning by means of rewards and punishments, and formation of aposteriorical knowledge based on conscious, theoretical analysis of observations. The latter, rational layer of consciousness can be built on the former, irrational layer only, if certain conditions are fulfilled. It is shown that rational cognition of values presupposes a notion of aposteriorical value, which challenges some conventions of the 'value-free' social science, in particular, the so called guillotine of Hume.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF01800694
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,786
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1959 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Balancing Acts: Rational Agency and Efficacious Action.Mary Tiles - 1999 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (3):289 – 300.
Irrationality and Cognition.John L. Pollock - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
The Dynamical Hypothesis in Social Cognition.J. Richard Eiser - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):638-638.
Scotus's Interpretation of Metaphysics 9.2.Cruz González-Ayesta - 2007 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:217-230.
Rational and Irrational Intentions: An Argument for Externalism.Wilhelm Vossenkuhl - 2002 - In Verena Mayer & Sabine A. Döring (eds.), Die Moralität der Gefühle. De Gruyter. pp. 163-174.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
32 ( #182,513 of 2,231,512 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #190,228 of 2,231,512 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature