Philosophical Studies 40 (3):419 - 429 (1981)
The article begins by developing a distinction between two sorts of epistemic justification--Namely, A proposition's being justified and a person's being justified in accepting a proposition. It concludes that the latter sort of justification is what is crucial for knowing. The article also makes various observations about the alleged foundation of knowledge and about chisholm's rules of evidence
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