On an Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (3):235 - 242 (1972)
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This paper propounds and defends a distinction between analytic and synthetic truth that is suggested by some well-Known remarks by c. S. Peirce. Important objections by quine and others to the usual distinction are discussed, And a definition of cognitive synonymy for predicates is offered. It is argued that the determinateness of a predicate's sense requires an analytic-Synthetic distinction for a large class of statements including that predicate. It is conceded that the predicates of everyday language probably do not possess a fully determinate meaning, But at best this shows, It is argued, That a satisfactory analytic-Synthetic distinction has the character of a conceptual ideal



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