Are physical properties dispositions?

Philosophy of Science 57 (1):118-132 (1990)
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Abstract

Several prominent philosophers have held that physical properties are dispositions. The aim of this paper is to establish the following conjunction: if the thesis that physical properties are dispositions is unsupplemented by controversial assumptions about dispositions, it entails a contradiction; and if it is so supplemented the resulting theory has the consequence that either many worlds which seem to be possible worlds are not possible worlds or some properties which seem to be identical are not identical. In this way it is shown that a dispositional account of physical properties is implausible

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
In Defense of Dispositions.D. H. Mellor - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (2):157-181.
Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction.Jonathan Bennett - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (1):57-91.

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