Synthese 189 (2):297-315 (2012)
AbstractThe scandal to philosophy and human reason, wrote Kant, is that we must take the existence of material objects on mere faith . In contrast, the skeptical paradox that has scandalized recent philosophy is not formulated in terms of faith, but rather in terms of justification, warrant, and entitlement. I argue that most contemporary approaches to the paradox (both dogmatist/liberal and default/conservative) do not address the traditional problem that scandalized Kant, and that the status of having a warrant (or justification) that is derived from entitlement is irrelevant to whether we take our beliefs on mere faith. For, one can have the sort of warrant that most contemporary anti-skeptics posit while still taking one’s belief on mere faith. An alternative approach to the traditional problem is sketched, one that still makes use of contemporary insights about “entitlement.”.
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Citations of this work
Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement.Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):193-214.
What Is Wrong With Agnostic Belief?Yuval Avnur - 2020 - In Agnosticism: Explorations in Philosophy and Religious Thought. pp. Ch 2.
The Skeptical Paradox and the Generality of Closure (and other principles).Yuval Avnur - forthcoming - In Duncan Pritchard & Matthew Jope (ed.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure.
On What Does Rationality Hinge?Yuval Avnur - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):246-257.
References found in this work
Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.