Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):439-447 (2011)
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| Abstract |
This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure-based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails
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| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01405.x |
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Citations of this work BETA
A Problem for the Closure Argument.Philip Atkins & Ian Nance - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1):36-49.
Defending the Ignorance View of Sceptical Scenarios.Tim Kraft - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):269-295.
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2011-11-02
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