Theoria 82 (1):81-88 (2016)

Yuval Avnur
Claremont College
In a recent article, Wilson argues that Cartesian Scepticism leads to a vicious regress that can only be stopped by rejecting Cartesian Scepticism. If she is right, Wilson has solved one of philosophy's enduring problems. However, her regress is irrelevant to Cartesian Scepticism. This is evident once the proposition that we should have doubts, the person who has doubts, and the person who thinks that we should have doubts are carefully distinguished
Keywords ignorance  epistemic responsibility  infinite regress  moral responsibility
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12070
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Unreasonable Cartesian Doubt.David Alexander - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):503-522.
Another Failed Refutation of Scepticism.Tom Stoneham & Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):19-30.

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