Theoria 82 (1):81-88 (2016)
AbstractIn a recent article, Wilson argues that Cartesian Scepticism leads to a vicious regress that can only be stopped by rejecting Cartesian Scepticism. If she is right, Wilson has solved one of philosophy's enduring problems. However, her regress is irrelevant to Cartesian Scepticism. This is evident once the proposition that we should have doubts, the person who has doubts, and the person who thinks that we should have doubts are carefully distinguished
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The regress argument against Cartesian skepticism.Jessica M. Wilson - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):668-673.