Basic Books (1984)
AbstractThe 'Evolution of Cooperation' addresses a simple yet age-old question; If living things evolve through competition, how can cooperation ever emerge? Despite the abundant evidence of cooperation all around us, there existed no purely naturalistic answer to this question until 1979, when Robert Axelrod famously ran a computer tournament featuring a standard game-theory exercise called The Prisoner's Dilemma. To everyone's surprise, the program that won the tournament, named Tit for Tat, was not only the simplest but the most "cooperative" entrant. This unexpected victory proved that cooperation - one might even say altruism - is mathematically possible and therefore needs no hidden hand or divine agent to create and sustain it. A great roadblock to the understanding of all sorts of behavior was at last removed. The updated edition includes an extensive new chapter on cooperation in cancer cells and among terrorist organizations.
Similar books and articles
On the Production and Ramification of Cooperation: The Cooperation Afforder with Framing Hypothesis.Steven O. Kimbrough - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (1):111-136.
Sort out your neighbourhood: Public good games on dynamic networks.Kai P. Spiekermann - 2009 - Synthese 168 (2):273 - 294.
Evolution of communication in perfect and imperfect worlds.Patrick Grim - 2000 - World Futures 56 (2):179-197.
Rapid cultural adaptation can facilitate the evolution of large-scale cooperation.Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson - unknown
The other cooperation problem: Generating benefit.Brett Calcott - 2008 - Biology and Philosophy 23 (2):179-203.
Evolving the Psychological Mechanisms for Cooperation.Jeffrey R. Stevens & Marc D. Hauser - 2005 - Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics 36:499-518.
Why the Proximate–Ultimate Distinction Is Misleading, and Why It Matters for Understanding the Evolution of Cooperation.Brett Calcott - 2013 - In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press. pp. 249.
On the original contract: Evolutionary game theory and human evolution.Alex Rosenberg & Stefan Linquist - 2005 - Analyse & Kritik 27 (1):136157.
Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications. [REVIEW]Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (2):99-159.
Cooperation in animals: An evolutionary overview. [REVIEW]Lee Alan Dugatkin - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (4):459-476.
Giochi di altruismo. L'approccio evoluzionistico alla cooperazione umana.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2012 - In Matt Ridley (ed.), Le Origini della Virtù. IBL Libri. pp. 7--38.
Cooperation and its Evolution.Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.) - 2013 - MIT Press.
What We Don’t Know about the Evolution of Cooperation in Animals.Deborah M. Gordon - 2013 - In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press.
Cooperation and Biological Markets: The Power of Partner Choice.Ronald Noe - 2013 - In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press. pp. 131.
Life in Interesting Times: Cooperation and Collective Action in the Holocene.Kim Sterelny - 2013 - In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
A mutualistic approach to morality: The evolution of fairness by partner choice.Nicolas Baumard, Jean-Baptiste André & Dan Sperber - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):59-122.
Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences.Gerd Gigerenzer & Henry Brighton - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (1):107-143.
Models and fictions in science.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (1):101 - 116.
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies.Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Richard McElreath, Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, Natalie Smith Henrich, Kim Hill, Francisco Gil-White, Michael Gurven, Frank W. Marlowe & John Q. Patton - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):795-815.
References found in this work
No references found.