Philosophical Studies 130 (1):131--152 (2006)
Today we find philosophical naturalists and Christian theists both expressing an interest in virtue epistemology, while starting out from vastly different assumptions. What can be done to increase fruitful dialogue among these divergent groups of virtue-theoretic thinkers? The primary aim of this paper is to uncover more substantial common ground for dialogue by wielding a double-edged critique of certain assumptions shared by `scientific' and `theistic' externalisms, assumptions that undermine proper attention to epistemic agency and responsibility. I employ a responsibilist virtue epistemology to this end, utilizing it most extensively in critique of Alvin Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief (2000). Epistemological externalism presages, I also argue, a new demarcation problem, but a secondary aim of the paper is to suggest reasons to think that `responsibilist externalism,' especially as glossed in virtue-theoretic terms, provides its proponents with the ability to adequately address this problem as we find it represented in a potent thought-experiment developed by Barry Stroud
|Keywords||Alvin Plantinga Reformed Epistemology Religious Exclusivism and Pluralism Toleration internalism and externalism virtue epistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology.Michael Williams - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Review: Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology. [REVIEW]Ernest Sosa - 1993 - Noûs 27 (1):51 - 65.
Citations of this work BETA
Reformed and Evolutionary Epistemology and the Noetic Effects of Sin.Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):49-66.
Two for the Show: Anti-Luck and Virtue Epistemologies in Consonance.Guy Axtell - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):363 - 383.
Similar books and articles
Problems for Virtue Theories in Epistemology.Robert Lockie - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):169 - 191.
Expanding The Situationist Challenge To Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology.Mark Alfano - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):223-249.
Can Religious Unbelief Be Proper Function Rational?Michael Czapkay Sudduth - 1999 - Faith and Philosophy 16 (3):297-314.
Moral Difficulties in Plantinga's Model of Warranted Christian Belief.Michael W. Austin - 2005 - Philosophy and Theology 17 (1-2):121-132.
Kierkegaard and Plantinga on Belief in God.C. Stephen Evans - 1988 - Faith and Philosophy 5 (1):25-39.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads129 ( #37,186 of 2,170,072 )
Recent downloads (6 months)22 ( #15,363 of 2,170,072 )
How can I increase my downloads?