Just the Right Thickness: A Defense of Second-Wave Virtue Epistemology

Philosophical Papers 37 (3):413-434 (2008)
Abstract
Abstract Do the central aims of epistemology, like those of moral philosophy, require that we designate some important place for those concepts located between the thin-normative and the non-normative? Put another way, does epistemology need ?thick? evaluative concepts? There are inveterate traditions in analytic epistemology which, having legitimized a certain way of viewing the nature and scope of epistemology's subject matter, give this question a negative verdict; further, they have carried with them a tacit commitment to what we argue to be an epistemic analogue of the reductionistic centralist thesis that Bernard Williams in our view successfully challenged in ethics. In this essay, we challenge these traditional dogmas and in doing so align ourselves with what has been recently called the ?Value Turn? in epistemology. From this perspective, we defend that, contrary to tradition, epistemology does need thick evaluative concepts. Further, the sort of theories that will be able to give thick evaluative concepts a deservedly central role in both belief and agent evaluation are those non-centralist projects that fall within what we call the second-wave of virtue epistemology. We recognize that, in breaking from centralism, there is a worry that a resulting anti-centralist theory will be reductionistic in the other direction- making the thick primary. We contend however that second-wave virtue epistemologies should be thought to provide the wave of the right thickness, and as such, constitute the most promising approaches within a field that has become increasingly more normative, diverse and expansive than was the traditional set of problems from which it emerged
Keywords epistemic norms  thick concepts  internalism and externalism  epistemic value  virtue epistemology
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DOI 10.1080/05568640809485229
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Mind, Value, and Reality.John Henry McDowell - 1998 - Harvard University Press.
The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge.John Greco - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):57–69.

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Citations of this work BETA
Reducing Responsibility: An Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Blame.Trent Dougherty - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):534-547.
Unifying the Intellectual Virtues.Christopher Lepock - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):106-128.

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