Recovering Responsibility

Logos and Episteme (3):429-454. (2011)
Abstract
This paper defends the epistemological importance of ‘diachronic’ or cross-temporal evaluation of epistemic agents against an interesting dilemma posed for this view in Trent Dougherty’s recent paper “Reducing Responsibility.” This is primarily a debate between evidentialists and character epistemologists, and key issues of contention that the paper treats include the divergent functions of synchronic and diachronic (longitudinal) evaluations of agents and their beliefs, the nature and sources of epistemic normativity, and the advantages versus the costs of the evidentialists’ reductionism about sources of epistemic normativity.
Keywords character epistemology  epistemic normativity  evidentialism  synchronic and diachronic  evidentialism
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ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme20112324
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