Synthese 158 (3):363 - 383 (2007)
This essay extends my side of a discussion begun earlier with Duncan Pritchard, the recent author of Epistemic Luck.Pritchard’s work contributes significantly to improving the “diagnostic appeal” of a neo-Moorean philosophical response to radical scepticism. While agreeing with Pritchard in many respects, the paper questions the need for his concession to the sceptic that the neo-Moorean is capable at best of recovering “‘brute’ externalist knowledge”. The paper discusses and directly responds to a dilemma that Pritchard poses for virtue epistemologies (VE). It also takes issue with Pritchard’s “merely safety-based” alternative. Ultimately, however, the criticisms made here of Pritchard’s dilemma and its underlying contrast of “anti-luck” and “virtue” epistemologies are intended to help realize his own aspirations for a better diagnosis of radical scepticism to inform a still better neo-Moorean response
|Keywords||Epistemic luck Virtue epistemology Virtue responsibilism Skepticism Neo-Moorean|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Recent Work on Radical Skepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):215-257.
Citations of this work BETA
Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (1):66–88.
Four Varieties of Character-Based Virtue Epistemology.Jason Baehr - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (4):469-502.
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Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths.Jeffrey Roland & Jon Cogburn - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):547-561.
A Problem for Pritchard's Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.J. Adam Carter - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):253-275.
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