In T. Dougherty & Trent Dougherty (eds.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 71-87 (2011)

Authors
Guy Axtell
Radford University
Abstract
Evidentialism as Earl Conee and Richard Feldman present it is a philosophy with distinct aspects or sides: Evidentialism as a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification, and as a prescriptive ethics of belief. I argue that Conee and Feldman's ethics of belief has 'weak roots and sour fruits.' It has weak roots because it is premised on their account of justification qua synchronic rationality, and I undercut this account. It has sour fruits because the austere evidentialist ethic of belief is unable to support reasonable disagreement, and eventuates in prescribing agnosticism in most cases of disagreement. I contrast this with John Rawls' understanding of "reasonable pluralism" and of the many sources of faultless disagreement over what Rawls termed comprehensive conceptions of the good.
Keywords epistemology of disagreement  ethics of belief  evidentialism  virtue epistemology  William James  Rational uniqueness  faith ventures  religious belief  John Rawls
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Recovering Responsibility.Guy Axtell - 2011 - Logos and Episteme (3):429-454..
Justifying the Principle of Indifference.Jon Williamson - forthcoming - European Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

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