A Structural Explanation of Injustice in Conversations: It's about Norms

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):726-748 (2018)
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In contrast to individualistic explanations of social injustice that appeal to implicit attitudes, structural explanations are unintuitive: they appeal to entities that lack clear ontological status, and the explanatory mechanism is similarly unclear. This makes structural explanations unappealing. The present work proposes a structural explanation of one type of injustice that happens in conversations, discursive injustice. This proposal meets two goals. First, it satisfactorily accounts for the specific features of this particular kind of injustice; and second, it articulates a structural explanation that overcomes their unattractiveness. The main idea is that discursive injustice is not the result of biased interlocutors, but of problematic discursive norms.



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Saray Ayala López
California State University, Sacramento

Citations of this work

Implicit bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Social structural explanation.Valerie Soon - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (10):e12782.
Implicit bias and social schema: a transactive memory approach.Valerie Soon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1857-1877.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

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