Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198 (2014)
Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it
|Keywords||Representationalism Affect Affective qualities Transparency Introspection Phenomenal content Pain Pleasure|
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References found in this work BETA
Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2009 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Making Sense of Unpleasantness: Evaluationism and Shooting the Messenger.Paul Boswell - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2969-2992.
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