Affect: representationalists' headache

Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198 (2014)
Abstract
Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it
Keywords Representationalism  Affect  Affective qualities  Transparency  Introspection  Phenomenal content  Pain  Pleasure
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0206-7
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,208
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.

View all 36 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain.Manolo Martínez - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.
What's so Transparent About Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.
Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology.Michael Shim - 2011 - Husserl Studies 27 (3):197-215.
Restrictions on Representationalism.Amy Kind - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):405-427.
Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency.Matthew Kennedy - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.
Exploring Subjective Representationalism.Neil Mehta - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):570-594.
Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character.Fiona Macpherson - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Stirling
Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference.Thomas Metzinger - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.
Strong Representationalism and Centered Content.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2013-09-20

Total downloads

144 ( #32,538 of 2,164,296 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

15 ( #22,114 of 2,164,296 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums