Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198 (2014)

Authors
Murat Aydede
University of British Columbia
Matthew Fulkerson
University of California, San Diego
Abstract
Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it
Keywords Representationalism  Affect  Affective qualities  Transparency  Introspection  Phenomenal content  Pain  Pleasure
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0206-7
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Valence and Value.Peter Carruthers - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):658-680.
Introspection Without Judgment.Anna Giustina - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
Recent Work on Pain.Jennifer Corns - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):737-753.
A Contemporary Account of Sensory Pleasure.Murat Aydede - 2018 - In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: A History. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 239-266.
Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2019 - In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and Deviance. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 27-59.

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