Is feeling pain the perception of something?

Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567 (2009)
Authors
Murat Aydede
University of British Columbia
Abstract
According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain (and other bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, orgasms, etc.), feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. In what follows I argue that given a natural understanding of what sensory perception requires and how it is integrated with (dedicated) conceptual systems, these accounts are mistaken. I will also examine the relationship between perceptual views and two (weak and strong) forms of representationalism about experience. I will argue that pains pose very serious problems for strong representationalism as well.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.5840/jphil20091061033
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Affect: Representationalists' Headache.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198.
Recent Work on Pain.Jennifer Corns - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):737-753.
The Inadequacy of Unitary Characterizations of Pain.Jennifer Corns - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):355-378.
Pain and Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - 2017 - The Monist 100 (4):485-500.

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