Facta Philosophica 2 (1):23-50 (2000)

Authors
Murat Aydede
University of British Columbia
Abstract
According to the Computational/Representational Theory of Thought (CRTT ? Language of Thought Hypothesis, or LOTH), propositional attitudes, such as belief, desire, and the like, are triadic relations among subjects, propositions, and internal mental representations. These representations form a representational _system_ physically realized in the brain of sufficiently sophisticated cognitive organisms. Further, this system of representations has a combinatorial syntax and semantics, but the processes that operate on the representations are causally sensitive only to their syntax, not to their semantics. On this approach, a first pass account of propositional attitudes is the following (cf. Field 1978: 37 and Fodor 1987: 17)
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References found in this work BETA

Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Language of Thought Hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Realizers and Vehicles of Mental Representation.Zoe Drayson - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 68:80-87.
Are Frege Cases Exceptions to Intentional Generalizations?Murat Aydede & Philip Robbins - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.

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