The experimental use of introspection in the scientific study of pain and its integration with third-person methodologies: The experiential-phenomenological approach

In Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press. pp. 243--273 (2005)
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Abstract

Understanding the nature of pain depends, at least partly, on recognizing its subjectivity (thus, its first-person epistemology). This in turn requires using a first-person experiential method in addition to third-person experimental approaches to study it. This paper is an attempt to spell out what the former approach is and how it can be integrated with the latter. We start our discussion by examining some foundational issues raised by the use of introspection. We argue that such a first-person method in the scientific study of pain (as in the study of any experience) is in fact indispensable by demonstrating that it has in fact been consistently used in conjunction with conventional third-person methodologies, and this for good reasons. We show that, contrary to what appears to be a widespread opinion, there is absolutely no reason to think that the use of such a first-person approach is scientifically and methodologically suspect. We distinguish between two uses of introspective methods in scientific experiments: one draws on the subjects’ introspective reports where any investigator has equal and objective access. The other is where the investigator becomes a subject of his own study and draws on the introspection of his own experiences. We give examples using and/or approximating both strategies that include studies of second pain summation and its relationship to neural activities, and brain imaging- psychophysical studies wherein sensory and affective qualities of pain are correlated with cerebral cortical activity. We explain what we call the experiential or phenomenological approach that has its origins in the work of Price and Barrell (1980). This approach capitalizes on the scientific prospects and benefits of using the introspection of the investigator. We distinguish between its vertical and horizontal applications. Finally, we conclude that integrating such an approach to standard third-person methodologies can only help us in having a fuller understanding of pain and of conscious experience in general.

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Murat Aydede
University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Experimenting with phenomenology.Shaun Gallagher & Jesper B. Sorensen - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):119-134.
The Paradox of Pain.Adam Bradley - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa084.
Defending the IASP Definition of Pain.Murat Aydede - 2017 - The Monist 100 (4):439–464.

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