Michael Richard Ayers
Cambridge University (PhD)
There is an ancient and ambiguous philosophical doctrine that perception is passive. This can mean that the mind contributes nothing to the content of our sensory experience: its power of perception is a mere receptivity. In this sense the principle has often been questioned, and is indeed doubtful on empirical grounds, given one reasonable interpretation of what it would be for the mind to make such a contribution.
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DOI 10.1017/s0080443600000625
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Action, Knowledge and Embodiment in Berkeley and Locke.Tom Stoneham - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):41-59.
Berkeley on the Activity of Spirits.Sukjae Lee - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (3):539-576.

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