Sobre a Concepção da Verdade em Tarski

Abstracta 2 (1):24-61 (2005)

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether Tarski’s truth definition explains the notion of truth as correspondence with reality and whether it is really a semantic definition of truth. I defend the view that, although Tarski succeeded in the task of constructing correct and adequate definitions, according to his own criteria of correctness and adequateness, the definitions obtained by his method neither are explanations of the main point of a correspondence theory of truth, the relationship between language and reality on which depends the truth of a sentence, nor can be considered genuinely semantic
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
Objective Knowledge.K. R. Popper - 1972 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 4 (2):388-398.
Truth.Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.) - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophy of Logic.Leslie Stevenson & W. V. Quine - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):80.

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