Oup Usa (2004)

Authors
Jody Azzouni
Tufts University
Abstract
If we take mathematical statements to be true, then must we also believe in the existence of invisible mathematical objects, accessible only by the power of thought? Jody Azzouni says we do not have to, and claims that the way to escape such a commitment is to accept - as an essential part of scientific doctrine - true statements which are 'about' objects which don't exist in any real sense.
Keywords nominalism   mathematics   platonism   metaphysics   toread
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 9780195159882
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 52,704
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Metaphysics and the New Science.Gary Hatfield - 1990 - In David Lindberg & Robert Westman (eds.), Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution, ed. by and (Cambridge:. Cambridge University Press. pp. 93–166.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Fictional Characters.Stacie Friend - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):141–156.
Ontological Commitment.Agustín Rayo - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):428–444.

View all 40 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-01-31

Total views
66 ( #142,432 of 2,340,075 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #516,585 of 2,340,075 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes