Deflating Existential Commitment: A Case for Nominalism

Oxford, England: Oup Usa (2004)
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Abstract

If we take mathematical statements to be true, then must we also believe in the existence of invisible mathematical objects, accessible only by the power of thought? Jody Azzouni says we do not have to, and claims that the way to escape such a commitment is to accept - as an essential part of scientific doctrine - true statements which are 'about' objects which don't exist in any real sense.

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Author's Profile

Jody Azzouni
Tufts University

Citations of this work

Abstract objects.Gideon Rosen - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Fictional characters.Stacie Friend - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):141–156.
Ontological commitment.Agustín Rayo - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):428–444.

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References found in this work

Metaphysics and the new science.Gary Hatfield - 1990 - In David Lindberg & Robert Westman (eds.), Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution, ed. by and (Cambridge:. Cambridge University Press. pp. 93–166.

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