Deflating Existential Commitment: A Case for Nominalism
Oxford, England: Oup Usa (2004)
Abstract
If we take mathematical statements to be true, then must we also believe in the existence of invisible mathematical objects, accessible only by the power of thought? Jody Azzouni says we do not have to, and claims that the way to escape such a commitment is to accept - as an essential part of scientific doctrine - true statements which are 'about' objects which don't exist in any real sense.Author's Profile
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9780195159882 0195159888 9780199834990
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Citations of this work
An Inferential Conception of the Application of Mathematics.Otávio Bueno & Mark Colyvan - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):345-374.
References found in this work
Metaphysics and the new science.Gary Hatfield - 1990 - In David Lindberg & Robert Westman (eds.), Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution, ed. by and (Cambridge:. Cambridge University Press. pp. 93–166.
