Synthese 190 (15):3175-3184 (2013)

Jody Azzouni
Tufts University
An argument for Trivialism, the view that natural languages are logically inconsistent, is provided that does not rely on contentious empirical assumptions about natural language terms such as “and” or “or.” Further, the view is defended against an important objection recently mounted against it by Thomas Hofweber
Keywords Trivialism  Inconsistency  Regimentation  Curry’s paradox
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-012-0136-5
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References found in this work BETA

The Inconsistency of Natural Languages: How We Live with It.Jody Azzouni - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):590 – 605.
Curry's Paradox.Robert K. Meyer, Richard Routley & J. Michael Dunn - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):124 - 128.
Evading Truth Commitments: The Problem Reanalyzed.Jody Azzouni - 2009 - Logique Et Analyse 52 (206):139.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Normative Argument Against Explosion.Mark Pinder - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):61-70.
Trivial Languages.Arvid Båve - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):1-17.

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