Stipulation, logic, and ontological independence

Philosophia Mathematica 8 (3):225-243 (2000)
A distinction between the epistemic practices in mathematics and in the empirical sciences is rehearsed to motivate the epistemic role puzzle. This is distinguished both from Benacerraf's 1973 epistemic puzzle and from sceptical arguments against our knowledge of an external world. The stipulationist position is described, a position which can address this puzzle. Methods of avoiding the stipulationist position by using pure logic to provide knowledge of mathematical abstracta are discussed and criticized
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/8.3.225
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Jody Azzouni (2008). Empty de Re Attitudes About Numbers. Philosophia Mathematica 17 (2):163-188.

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