Theory, observation and scientific realism

A normative constraint on theories about objects which we take to be real is explored: such theories are required to track the properties of the objects which they are theories of. Epistemic views in which observation (and generalizations of it) play a central role, and holist views which see epistemic virtues as applicable only to whole theories, are contrasted in the light of this constraint. It's argued that global-style epistemic virtues can't meet the constraint, although (certain) epistemic views within which observation (and, more generally, thick epistemic access) are centralized do meet it.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/55.3.371
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J. Azzouni & O. Bueno (2016). True Nominalism: Referring Versus Coding. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3):781-816.
Peter Kosso (2006). Detecting Extrasolar Planets. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2):224-236.

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