Authors
Jody Azzouni
Tufts University
Abstract
Kripke’s version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox has been influential. My concern is with how it—and Wittgenstein’s views more generally—have been perceived as undercutting the individualistic picture of mathematical practice: the view that individuals— Robinson Crusoes —can, entirely independently of a community, engage in cogent mathematics, and indeed have “private languages.” What has been denied is that phrases like “correctly counting” can be applied to such individuals because these normative notions can only be applied cogently in a context involving community standards. I attempt to show that this shocking corollary doesn’t follow even if Kripke’s Wittgensteinian objections to dispositional approaches to rule-following are largely right. My reason for claiming this is that there is another solution to the rule-following paradox, one that doesn’t favor community standards over individual ones. Furthermore, it doesn’t replace truth conditions with assertability conditions; and this latter maneuver is essential to Kripke’s sceptical solution favoring the community over the individual.
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Reprint years 2009
DOI 10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.278
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New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Kathleen Okruhlik - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (4):692-694.

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