Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (2):126-36 (1993)
After suggesting an operational definition for fringe experiences—as opposed to clearly conscious and clearly unconscious phenomena—we examine three empirical cases: The tip-of-the-tongue experience, the fringe experience of "wrongness," and the case of conscious focus on abstract, hard-to-image conscious contents. In each case, Mangan′s four major claims are explored in some detail. Most tasks seem to involve a combination of conscious experiences, complex unconscious representations, and multiple fringe experiences. The chief disagreement from this analysis involves vague experiences that are generally believed to be focal: The case of currently topical abstract concepts, which are not reported as conscious images or percepts. In the interest of caution, it may be better to speak of "conscious access" to focal abstract concepts, rather than "conscious experience" of such concepts. There may be other vague but focally conscious phenomena, such as an intention to act, the signal for executing a prepared action, and so on. Mangan′s points are generally supported, with some qualifications
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The Imagination: Cognitive, Pre-Cognitive, and Meta-Cognitive Aspects.Kieron P. O'Connor & Frederick Aardema - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2):233-256.
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