Authors
Patrik Baard
Malmö University
Abstract
Instrumental values are often considered to be inferior to intrinsic values. One reason for this is that instrumental values are extrinsic and rely on two factors: a means–end relationship that is conducive to something of final or intrinsic value. In this paper, I will investigate the conditions under which bearers of instrumental value are given different value or owed different levels of respect. Such conditions include the number of means that are conducive to something of final or intrinsic value as well as the form of causality that is implied. It will be suggested that different numbers and causal relations will imply different degrees of reverence or respect to the bearers of instrumental value. I will also critically investigate recent proposals such as relational values that allegedly go beyond the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value. Drawing from this critical analysis, a nuanced picture of instrumental value will be provided.
Keywords Filosofi  Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2019
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10806-019-09762-7
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,682
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
Principia Ethica.Evander Bradley McGilvary - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (3):351.
Rethinking Intrinsic Value.Shelly Kagan - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), The Journal of Ethics. Springer. pp. 97--114.
Rethinking Intrinsic Value.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):277-297.
Causes and Conditions.J. L. Mackie - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (4):245 - 264.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Two Distinctions in Environmental Goodness.Karen Green - 1996 - Environmental Values 5 (1):31 - 46.
Can Instrumental Value Be Intrinsic?Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):137-157.
Instrumental Values – Strong and Weak.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23 - 43.
Instrumental Values €“ Strong and Weak.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23-43.
Relational Values.Barbara Muraca - 2016 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):19-38.
Rethinking Intrinsic Value.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):277-297.
“Intrinsically” or Just “Instrumentally” Valuable? On Structural Types of Values of Scientific Knowledge.Peter P. Kirschenmann - 2001 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 32 (2):237-256.
Fitting-Attitude Analyses and the Relation Between Final and Intrinsic Value.Antoine C. Dussault - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):166-189.
The Myth of Instrumental Rationality.Joseph Raz - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1):28.
Species of Goodness.William Benjamin Bradley - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Instrumental Rationality and Beyond.Yossi Yonah - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-02-28

Total views
12 ( #729,899 of 2,349,382 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #510,581 of 2,349,382 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes