A Theory of Epistemic Risk

Philosophy of Science 86 (3):522-550 (2019)

Authors
Boris Babic
California Institute of Technology
Abstract
I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy. This duality between risk and information enables us to explore the relationship between attitudes to epistemic risk, the choice of scoring rules in epistemic utility theory, and the selection of priors in Bayesian epistemology more generally.
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DOI 10.1086/703552
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References found in this work BETA

Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
In Defence of Objective Bayesianism.Jon Williamson - 2010 - Oxford University Press.

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