Philosophical Studies 153 (2):307 (2011)

Andrew Bacon
University of Southern California
I consider two puzzles in which an agent undergoes a sequence of decision problems. In both cases it is possible to respond rationally to any given problem yet it is impossible to respond rationally to every problem in the sequence, even though the choices are independent. In particular, although it might be a requirement of rationality that one must respond in a certain way at each point in the sequence, it seems it cannot be a requirement to respond as such at every point for that would be to require the impossible.
Keywords Supertask  Infinite decision puzzle  Rationality  Deontic Barcan formula
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9496-1
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References found in this work BETA

A Reply to New Zeno.Stephen Yablo - 2000 - Analysis 60 (2):148–151.
An Infinite Decision Puzzle.Jeffrey Barrett & Frank Arntzenius - 1999 - Theory and Decision 46 (1):101-103.

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The Labours of Zeno – a Supertask Indeed?Barbara M. Sattler - 2019 - Ancient Philosophy Today 1 (1):1-17.

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