Practical and scientific rationality: A difficulty for Levi's epistemology

Synthese 57 (3):269 - 276 (1983)
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Abstract

Traditionally scientific rationality has been distinguished from mere practical rationality. It has seemed that it is sometimes rational to accept statements for the purposes of particular practical deliberations even though it would not be rational to count them as having been confirmed by science. Isaac Levi contends that this traditional view is mistaken. He thinks that there should be a single standard of acceptance for all purposes, scientific and practical. The author contends that Levi has given no good reason for identifying scientific with practical rationality. And he argues that Levi's own theory is inconsistent with the thesis that a scientist should use a single standard of acceptance in all his scientific deliberations.

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Citations of this work

Truthlikeness.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1987 - Dordrecht: Reidel.

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References found in this work

Theory and Evidence.Clark N. Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (3):498-500.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Ethics 93 (3):613-615.
Gambling with Truth.Isaac Levi - 1968 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (3):261-263.

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