Psychological Concept Acquisition

In N. Payette (ed.), Connected Minds: Cognition and Interaction in the Social World. Cambridge Scholars Press (2013)
This essay adjudicates between theoretical models of psychological concept acquisition. I provide new reasons to be skeptical about both simulationist and modularist models. I then defend the scientific-theory-theory account against familiar objections. I conclude by arguing that the scientific-theory-theory account must be supplemented by an account of hypothesis discovery.
Keywords Folk Pscyhology  Simulation  Theory Theory  Modularity Theory  Psychological Concept  Belief Concept  False Belief  Conceptual Development
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