Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):131-163 (2015)

Authors
Andrew Bacon
University of Southern California
Abstract
In this paper I present a precise version of Stalnaker's thesis and show that it is both consistent and predicts our intuitive judgments about the probabilities of conditionals. The thesis states that someone whose total evidence is E should have the same credence in the proposition expressed by 'if A then B' in a context where E is salient as they have conditional credence in the proposition B expresses given the proposition A expresses in that context. The thesis is formalised rigorously and two models are provided that demonstrate that the new thesis is indeed tenable within a standard possible world semantics based on selection functions. Unlike the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics the selection functions cannot be understood in terms of similarity. A probabilistic account of selection is defended in its place. -/- I end the paper by suggesting that this approach overcomes some of the objections often leveled at accounts of indicatives based on the notion of similarity.
Keywords Stalnaker's Thesis  Conditionals  Indicatives  Conditional Probability  Adams' Thesis  Contextualism
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DOI 10.1017/s1755020314000318
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References found in this work BETA

On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
Indicative Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):269-286.
Inquiry.Jon Barwise - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (3):429.
Conditionals.Angelika Kratzer - 1986 - Chicago Linguistics Society 22 (2):1–15.
Probability and Conditionals.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.

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Citations of this work BETA

Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.
Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.
Conditional Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 131-198.
Probabilities of Conditionals in Context.Justin Khoo - 2016 - Linguistics and Philosophy 39 (1):1-43.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

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