Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):105-105 (1997)
Mele views self-deception as belief sustained by motivationally biased treatment of evidence. This view overlooks something essential, for it does not reckon with the fact that in self-deception the truth is dangerously close at hand and must be repeatedly suppressed. Self-deception is not so much a matter of what one positively believes as what one manages not to think.
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At "Permanent Risk": Reasoning and Self-Knowledge in Self-Deception.Dion Scott-Kakures - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):576-603.
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