The myth of conventional implicature

Linguistics and Philosophy 22 (4):327-366 (1999)
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Abstract

Grice’s distinction between what is said and what is implicated has greatly clarified our understanding of the boundary between semantics and pragmatics. Although border disputes still arise and there are certain difficulties with the distinction itself (see the end of §1), it is generally understood that what is said falls on the semantic side and what is implicated on the pragmatic side. But this applies only to what is..

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original Bach, Kent (1999) "but merely in what is indicated by (the presence of) the word 'but':(1) Shaq is huge but he is agile". Linguistics and Philosophy 22():327-366

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Kent Bach
San Francisco State University

Citations of this work

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Slurring Words.Luvell Anderson & Ernie Lepore - 2011 - Noûs 47 (1):25-48.

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References found in this work

Thought and reference.Kent Bach - 1987 - New York: Clarendon Press.
On sense and reference.Gottlob Frege - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 36--56.
Relevance.D. Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 1986 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 2.
The Pragmatics of What is Said.François Recanati - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (4):295-329.

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