You Don't Say?

Synthese 128 (1):15-44 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper defends a purely semantic notion of what is said against various recent objections. The objections each cite some sort of linguistic, psychological, or epistemological fact that is supposed to show that on any viable notion of what a speaker says in uttering a sentence, there is pragmatic intrusion into what is said. Relying on a modified version of Grice's notion, on which what is said must be a projection of the syntax of the uttered sentence, I argue that a purely semantic notion is needed to account for the linguistically determined input to the hearer's inference to what, if anything, the speaker intends to be conveying in uttering the sentence.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,247

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Problems of Philosophy Problem #12: Epistemology From a Strategic Viewpoint.[author unknown] - 1998 - Synthese 116 (1):113-113.


Added to PP

230 (#52,152)

6 months
6 (#123,402)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kent Bach
San Francisco State University

Citations of this work

The Radical Account of Bare Plural Generics.Anthony Nguyen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1303-1331.
Speaker Intentions in Context.Jeffrey C. King - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):219-237.
The Evidence for Relativism.Max Kölbel - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):375-395.
Necessitarian Propositions.Jonathan Schaffer - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):119-162.
The Efficacy of Anger: Recognition and Retribution.Laura Luz Silva - 2021 - In Ana Falcato (ed.), The Politics of Emotional Shockwaves. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 27-55.

View all 77 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Studies in the Way of Words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Thought and Reference.Kent Bach - 1987 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

View all 32 references / Add more references