A Lindström theorem for intuitionistic propositional logic


Authors
Guillermo Badia
University of Queensland
Abstract
It is shown that propositional intuitionistic logic is the maximal (with respect to expressive power) abstract logic satisfying a certain topological property reminiscent of compactness, the Tarski union property and preservation under asimulations.
Keywords Intuitionistic logic    Lindstrom theorem  asimulations  abstract model theory
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