Credit Theories and the Value of Knowledge

Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):1-22 (2012)
Authors
Jason Baehr
Loyola Marymount University
Abstract
One alleged advantage of credit theories of knowledge is that they are capable of explaining why knowledge is essentially more valuable than mere true belief. I argue that credit theories in fact provide grounds for denying this claim and therefore are incapable of overcoming the ‘value problem’ in epistemology. Much of the discussion revolves around the question of whether true belief is always epistemically valuable. I also consider to what extent, if any, my main argument should worry credit theorists
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.698.x
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“Two Types of Wisdom”.Jason Baehr - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):81-97.
Inferior Disagreement.Maura Priest - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):263-283.

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