Philosophiques 28 (1):69-86 (2001)

Authors
Bernard Baertschi
University of Geneva
Abstract
On a reproché au modèle perceptuel de la connaissance morale d'être inadéquat en ce qu'il serait incapable d'expliquer le signe distinctif et fondamental de l'éthique, à savoir son caractère normatif. Je tente de montrer que la critique n'est pas pertinente, car le normatif n'a en réalité qu'une place dérivée en morale : l'éthique est d'abord une question de valeurs, entités dont il est tout à fait plausible de dire que nous les percevons. Pour justifier la place dérivée du normatif, je m'appuie sur les études de Max Scheler et sur l'examen de certains traits de la psychologie morale, qui tendent à montrer que le normatif n'est qu'un cas particulier de l'axiologique, mettant en évidence les caractères de force des valeurs, de risques de transgression et de contrainte.The perceptual model of moral knowledge has been the target of criticisms: it could be unable to explain the basic character of ethics, namely its normative character. I try to show that this criticism is misguided: in fact normativity is not central but lateral to ethics. What matters in ethics first and foremost are values, and it is quite appropriate to say we perceive values. To justify the lateral character of normativity, I rely on some analysis of Max Scheler and turn to some traits of moral psychology. It suggests that the normativity is a province of the axiological, characterized by strength of values, risks of transgression and constraint
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DOI 10.7202/004895ar
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Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785/2002 - Oxford University Press.
The Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1797/1996 - Cambridge University Press.

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