Is There a Value Problem?

In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 42--59 (2009)
Abstract
The value problem in epistemology is rooted in a commonsense intuition to the effect that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. Call this the “guiding intuition.” The guiding intuition generates a problem in light of two additional considerations. The first is that knowledge is (roughly) justified or warranted true belief.[1] The second is that on certain popular accounts of justification or warrant (e.g. reliabilism), its value is apparently instrumental to and hence derivative from the value of true belief.[2] But if knowledge is justified true belief and the value of justification is derivative from that of true belief, how is it that knowledge is more valuable than true belief?
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Citations of this work BETA
Curiosity Was Framed.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.
Reliabilism and the Extra Value of Knowledge.Wayne Davis & Christoph Jäger - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):93-105.
Meno and the Monist.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):157-170.
The Value of Knowledge and The Test of Time.Miranda Fricker - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:121-138.

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