Morality as a rational requirement

Philosophy 77 (3):447-453 (2002)
Abstract
John Searle has recently produced an argument for strong altruism which rests on the recognition that ‘I believe my need for help is a reason for you to help me’. The argument fails to recognize the difference between ‘a reason for me for you to help me’ and ‘a reason for you for you to help me.’ These are two logically distinct types of reason and the existence of one can never therefore be enough to establish the existence of the other. The existence of this logical gap is a major obstacle for any argument for morality as a rational requirement that attempts to universalise from reasons individual persons have to act morally.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0031819102000384
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 25,091
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Group-Based Reasons for Action.Christopher Woodard - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):215-229.
Asymmetry, Scope, and Rational Consistency.Julian Fink - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):109-130.
Reasons and Advice for the Practically Rational.Robert N. Johnson - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):619-625.
What Rationality Adds to Animal Morality.Bruce N. Waller - 1997 - Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):341-356.
The Scope of Rational Requirements.John Brunero - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):28-49.
Against Public Reason Liberalism's Accessibility Requirement.Kevin Vallier - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (3):366-389.
Defending Fundamental Requirements of Practical Reason.David Alm - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:77-102.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

18 ( #258,662 of 2,132,866 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #388,508 of 2,132,866 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums