Thinking and Reasoning 12 (3):329 – 350 (2006)

The disjunction effect (Tversky & Shafir, 1992) occurs when decision makers prefer option x (versus y) when knowing that event A occurs and also when knowing that event A does not occur, but they refuse x (or prefer y) when not knowing whether or not A occurs. This form of incoherence violates Savage's (1954) sure-thing principle, one of the basic axioms of the rational theory of decision making. The phenomenon was attributed to a lack of clear reasons for accepting an option (x) when subjects are under uncertainty. Through a pragmatic analysis of the task and a consequent reformulation of it, we show that the effect does not depend on the presence of uncertainty, but on the introduction of non-relevant goals into the text problem, in both the well-known Gamble problem and the Hawaii problem.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/13546780500375663
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,039
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
Intentions in Communication.Philip R. Cohen, Jerry Morgan & Martha E. Pollack - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):245.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
76 ( #151,919 of 2,505,999 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,828 of 2,505,999 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes