Respect and Membership in the Moral Community

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):113 - 128 (2007)
Abstract
Some philosophers object that Kant's respect cannot express mutual recognition because it is an attitude owed to persons in virtue of an abstract notion of autonomy and invite us to integrate the vocabulary of respect with other persons-concepts or to replace it with a social conception of recognition. This paper argues for a dialogical interpretation of respect as the key-mode of recognition of membership in the moral community. This interpretation highlights the relational and practical nature of respect, and accounts for its governing role over other persons-regarding concepts
Keywords respect  mutual recognition  Kantian ethics  blame  care
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-006-9053-3
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References found in this work BETA
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Respect for Persons, Identity, and Information Technology.Robin S. Dillon - 2010 - Ethics and Information Technology 12 (1):17-28.

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