Humana Mente 5 (20):93-116 (2012)

Authors
Carla Bagnoli
University of Modena
Abstract
This paper takes a constitutivist approach to self-deception, and argues that this phenomenon should be evaluated under several dimensions of rationality. The constitutivist approach has the merit of explaining the selective nature of self-deception as well as its being subject to moral sanction. Self-deception is a pragmatic strategy for maintaining the stability of the self, hence continuous with other rational activities of self-constitution. However, its success is limited, and it costs are high: it protects the agent’s self by undermining the authority she has on her mental life. To this extent, self-deception is akin to alienation and estrangement. Its morally disturbing feature is its self-serving partiality. The self-deceptive agent settles on standards of justification that are lower than any rational agent would adopt, and thus loses grip on her agency. To capture the moral dimension of self-deception, I defend a Kantian account of the constraints that bear on self-constitution, and argue that it warrants more discriminating standards of agential autonomy than other contemporary minimalist views of self-government.
Keywords self-deception  constructivism
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References found in this work BETA

Necessity, Volition, and Love.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Self-Deception Unmasked.Alfred R. Mele - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):448-454.

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Citations of this work BETA

Self-deception and selectivity.Alfred R. Mele - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2697-2711.
Self-Deception as a Moral Failure.Jordan MacKenzie - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.

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