Sidgwick and Kant on Practical Knowledge and Rational Action


Authors
Carla Bagnoli
University of Modena
Abstract
In this chapter, I compare and contrast Kant’s and Sidgwick’s arguments in defense of moral cognition as objective practical knowledge. Kant focuses on practical truths in terms of practical laws governing the mind in action, while Sidgwick is concerned with practical truths about action. I argue that this is a crucial difference in the understanding of practical knowledge, which is matched by a different understanding of moral phenomenology and of the significance of subjective experience in accounting for the authority of moral obligations. Key to these differences is a more fundamental divergence regarding the nature of reflection, its dynamics, and its impact on agency
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,058
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Practical Ethics in Sidgwick and Kant.Anthony Skelton - 2020 - In Tyler Paytas & Tim Henning (eds.), Kantian and Sidgwickian Ethics: The Cosmos of Duty Above and the Moral Law Within. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 13-39.
Practical Cognition, Intuition, and the Fact of Reason.Patrick Kain - 2010 - In Benjamin Lipscomb & James Krueger (eds.), Kant's Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality. de Gruyter. pp. 211--230.
Henry Sidgwick's Practical Ethics.Sissela Bok - 2000 - Utilitas 12 (3):361.
Knowledge, Practical Reasoning and Action.Peter Baumann - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (1):7-26.
Sidgwick, Dualism and Indeterminacy in Practical Reason.David Phillips - 1998 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 15 (1):57 - 78.
Handlungen, Absichten Und Praktisches Wissen.David Horst - 2013 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (3):373-386.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-05-06

Total views
0

Recent downloads (6 months)
0

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes