Why conceptual schemes?

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (3):287–306 (1998)
Abstract
According to Donald Davidson, the very idea of a conceptual scheme is the third dogma of empiricism. In this paper I examine the ways in which this claim may be interpreted. I conclude by arguing that there remains an innocent version of the scheme -content distinction which is not motivated by empiricism and does not commit us to the pernicious type of dualism that Davidson rejects
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9264.00038
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On Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Schemes and Conceptual Relativism.Xinli Wang - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):140-164.

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