Ockham's Razor and the Identity of Indiscernables

Philosophy Research Archives 14:405-414 (1988)
Abstract
In this paper it is argued that The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles can be justified as a concrete application of Ockham’s Razor, the maxim which enjoins us not to multiply entities beyond necessity. First, a statement of the Principle is presented, according to which the Principle, while interesting enough, is not logically necessary. It is then argued that the assumption of the falsity of the Principle prescribes an epistemological situation where it seems to be impossible to find grounds for thinking that the Principle is indeed false. Hence it is to be accepted as an epistemological necessity of sorts, one that recommended by the desire not to multiply entities beyond need
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  History of Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0164-0771
DOI 10.5840/pra1988/19891416
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Identity and Necessary Similarity.Raja Bahlul - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):531 - 546.

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