Philosophia 44 (4):1185-1208 (2016)
AbstractConstitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed. In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements, which are not constructed, but real, given independently from us; instead, my concern will be more narrowly epistemic – whether those claims can be derived from premises, which are normatively less substantial than the normative conclusions themselves. I focus on Korsgaard’s transcendental articulation of the constitutivist argument. I conclude that more work would need to be done, in order for this argument to function as intended.
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References found in this work
Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work
Universal Principle of Right: Metaphysics, Politics, and Conflict Resolutions.Sorin Baiasu - 2018 - Kantian Review 23 (4):527-554.
The Collective Archives of Mind : An Exploration of Reasons From Metaethics to Social Ontology.Gloria Mähringer - unknown
Habermasian Constructivism: An Alternative to the Constitutivist Argument.Dafydd Huw Rees - 2020 - Kantian Review 25 (4):675-698.
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