Philosophical Topics 37 (1):1-24 (2009)

Abstract
It can seem natural to say that, when in pain, we undergo experiences which present to us certain experience-dependent particulars, namely pains. As part of his wider approach to mind and world, John McDowell has elaborated an interesting but neglected version of this account of pain. Here I set out McDowell’s account at length, and place it in context. I argue that his subjectivist conception of the objects of pain experience is incompatible with his requirement that such experience be presentational, rationalizing, and classificatory
Keywords pain  mcdowell  color  perception  response dependence
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ISBN(s) 0276-2080
DOI 10.5840/philtopics200937113
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What Makes Pains Unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
The Imperative View of Pain.David Bain - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):164-85.

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